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RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH SUBJECTIVE PEER
EVALUATIONS∗
JOYEE DEB†, JIN LI‡, AND ARIJIT MUKHERJEE§
Abstract. We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with
multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals
as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the effort provision are
done by different workers (as in a supervisor/agent hierarchy), we show that, using both the
private and public signals, the first best can be achieved even in a static setting. However,
if each worker is required to both exert effort and report on his co-worker’s performance (as
in a team setting), the worker’s effort incentives cannot be decoupled from his truth-telling
incentives. This makes the optimal static contract ineffi cient and relational contracts based
on the public signals increase effi ciency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore
signals that are informative of the worker’s effort.
1. Introduction
In modern labor markets, most workers perform jobs where objective performance mea-
sures are hard to obtain (Prendargast, 1999). Consequently, firms often rely on subjective
performance measures to provide work incentives. For instance, a firm may use performance
measures such as leadership skills, entrepreneurial drive or client satisfaction scores. Some
of these subjective measures may be publicly observable. It is well-known that such publicly
observable measures (even if they are subjective and imperfect) can be used as an input into
compensation structure to sharpen worker incentives.
However, there may be other valuable performance-related information that is not publicly
observable, but rather diffused within the organization. This is becoming increasingly the
case with the prevalence of team-based organizations1 coupled with increased complexity
of tasks and decentralization of authority. In such settings, co-workers may have the most
information about an individual’s performance and contribution towards the overall team
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outcome (Fedor et. al, 1999; May and Gueldenzoph, 2006). However, it may be diffi cult for
the organization to elicit and use this information as it is privately observed by workers and
inherently subjective.
Indeed, firms often institute systematic processes to elicit subjective evaluation of a
worker’s performance from his co-workers. For example, in a typical organizational hier-
archy, the supervisor is often in charge of evaluating her subordinates’ performance and
providing this information to the owners of the firm (see Tirole, 1986 and the references
therein). In a team-production environment, the use of 360-evaluations is commonplace.
Under such evaluations the firm seeks a worker’s performance evaluation from several peo-
ple who worked closely with him during the evaluation period irrespective of their relative
position in the organizational hierarchy. As May and Gueldenzoph (2006) note, increasingly
“companies are turning to 360-degree multi-rater feedback and intragroup peer evaluation
systems for the purpose of managing performance and determining compensation rewards”
(p. 5). An estimated 90 percent of Fortune 1000 firms have implemented some form of
multi-source assessment that includes peer evaluations (Edwards and Ewen, 1996). Such
feedback is typically privately observed by the firm to ensure anonymity of the evaluator
and to encourage candid reporting.
It is well-documented that firms often combine both publicly observed subjective measures
and subjective private performance evaluation in their compensation policies. For example,
Field (2010) presents a Harvard Business Review (HBR) case study of a mutual fund com-
pany in which the performance evaluation system for portfolio managers involves paying
bonuses where 60 percent of the bonus is determined by the financial performance of the
fund they direct and 40 percent determined by the quality of teamwork, which is assessed
through structured feedback (gathered from team members and analyzed by top managers).
Another HBR case study by Rose and Sesia (2010) on the investment bank Credit Suisse
highlights a similar compensation structure.2,3
The central objective of this article is to explain how a firm should optimally use public
and private subjective measures to offer sharper work incentives. When the performance
measure is public (but nevertheless subjective), a common channel for incentive provision is
a relational contract. In a relational contract, a firm offers workers a discretionary bonus
based on their publicly observed performance, and the firm lives up to its promised payments
as reneging may result in future retaliation by the workers.4 But offering performance pay
based on private (subjective) evaluation is fraught with a unique set of challenges. As the
workers’information about their colleagues’performance is inherently private, the firm must
provide the workers the right incentives to report their evaluations truthfully. Moreover, as
2In addition to the financial service sector, similar compensation policy is also documented in other indus-
tries, such as consumer goods. Simon and Kindred (2012) reports a case study on Henkel, a manufacturer of
personal care products, where workers’compensation includes a significant variable pay (bonus) component,
that depends on overall organization performance, team results, and the team leaders’subjective evaluations
on the workers’individual contributions.
3Note that some aspects of the firm’s performance, such as sales volume or revenue generation in a given
fiscal year, are verifiable, and can, in principle, affect a worker’s compensation through explicit contracts.
But the examples above indicate that the firms often refrain from using such explicit contracts. One reason
for such a policy is that these verifiable measures are often misaligned with the firm’s long-term goals and
the workers may be tempted to manipulate such measures for their short-term gains. Consequently, firms
often rely on relational contracts based on alternative measures of the divisional performance that are better
aligned with their objectives (see, e.g., Baker et. al, 1994, and the references therein).
4See, for instance, Bull (1987), Levin (2003), and Malcomson (2010) for a survey.
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the subjective evaluations are also reported privately to the firm, the firm itself must have
the incentive to report the true evaluations back to the workers. It turns out that, in this
setting, the truthful revelation of private subjective information may impose an additional
agency cost on the firm as the workers’incentive for exerting effort is closely interlinked with
their incentive for truthful reporting.
A key focus of our article is to understand the interplay between these incentives and
characterize the optimal use of dispersed private information. We study a setting in which
a firm has access to both publicly observable performance measures and privately observed
(and privately reported) performance measures, and explore how incentives based on pri-
vate information can be effectively combined with relational contracts that rely on publicly
available information. An important finding of our article is that the nature of the optimal
contract depends crucially on the role played by agents in the organization: In particular,
it depends on whether there is a separation of the informative and the productive roles.
Accordingly, we distinguish between two settings.
First, we consider a simple model of organizational hierarchy where the informative and
productive roles are played by different workers. We consider a supervisor-agent pair in which
the agent is solely responsible for production and the supervisor’s only role is to (privately)
observe and report the agent’s performance. Thus, the effort incentives are relevant only
for the agent and the incentives for truthful reporting relevant only for the supervisor. The
firm may offer different contracts to the supervisor and the agent that depend both on the
agent’s publicly observed output and the private evaluation sent by the supervisor.
Second, we consider a more general model where the firm repeatedly interacts with two
workers, but now each worker performs both an informative role and a productive role.
The two agents work as a team in every period; each agent must exert effort towards the
team output, and also (privately) evaluate his co-worker. (Note that such an environment
is similar in spirit to ones where 360 evaluation is commonly used). The firm now has
potentially two different channels for incentive provision: a “public performance bonus”
based on the publicly observed team output and a “subjective performance bonus”based on
the agents’peer-evaluations that are privately reported to the firm.
The features of the optimal contract are substantively different in these two settings.
First, when the effort and the information roles are separated, we show that the first-
best outcome can be achieved even in the static setting (thus, making relational contracts
irrelevant). Here, the optimal contract penalizes the agent only if both the public output and
the supervisor’s evaluation are at their respective worst levels. The supervisor is penalized
only if the output is the best feasible one in spite of his evaluation of the agent being the
worst. Finally, in order to penalize a worker (i.e., either the agent or the supervisor), the
firm simply transfers a part of his wage to the other worker. Now, by choosing the penalty
amounts appropriately, the firm can ensure that neither the agent wants to shirk on his effort
nor the supervisor lies on his report (in anticipation of receiving a penalty transfer from the
agent). Essentially, the optimal contract induces a lottery between the supervisor and the
agent that elicits the first-best effort and truthful reporting.
Next, we consider the case when workers must play both informative and productive roles.
Here we ask three questions: First, what is the optimal contract in the static setting? We
find that in contrast to the setting with separation in roles, here the optimal static contract
is necessarily ineffi cient. But similar to the previous setting, the peer evaluation is still
sparingly used in the optimal contract; i.e., peer evaluation affects a worker’s pay only in
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the unlikely event that both the public output is at its lowest level and his co-worker sends
the worst possible report about him. In this case the worker’s pay is lowered to punish him
for poor performance; otherwise the worker earns a fixed compensation.
To see why the first best cannot be achieved, note that each worker now has two incentive
constraints: to exert effort and to tell the truth about his peers. More importantly, these
two constraints cannot be decoupled as a worker may resort to a “double deviation”: after
he shirks, he may also want to lie about his co-worker’s performance. (Trivially, this issue
does not show up in our earlier setting as we assume a separation between the information
and the production role of a worker.) Due to such potential deviations, contracts in which a
worker’s penalty amount is transferred to his co-worker are no longer feasible. This implies
that incentive pay based on such private peer reports must call for a “joint punishment”in
the form of surplus destruction. That is, whenever the firm punishes the worker by lowering
his wage due to poor evaluation, the firm must also incur a cost in the form of lost surplus
that it could have accrued otherwise. Indeed, if there is no joint punishment, the firm may
manipulate the peer evaluations that it receives: As the reports are private, the firm has an
incentive to understate a worker’s evaluation in order to lower his wage payment. Hence,
if subjective peer evaluations are to be used to provide work incentives, surplus destruction
is necessary in equilibrium and first best cannot be achieved (the literature on subjective
performance measure with single-worker also makes this observation; see, for example, Levin,
2003; MacLeod, 2003; and Fuchs, 2007). The optimal contract is the one that minimizes the
surplus destruction in equilibrium given the incentive constraints on the workers.
The ineffi ciency of the static optimal contract naturally leads us to our second question:
How can effi ciency be improved in a dynamic setting where incentives through the subjective
performance bonus may be supplemented by a public performance bonus sustained through
relational contracts? The main result of our article characterizes how the firms should
optimally use these two instruments. Clearly, the firm would prefer to use a public bonus
alone, and thus avoid surplus destruction, if possible. It turns out that when the firm is
patient enough, a public performance bonus sustained through a relational contract suffi ces
to provide effort incentives. In contrast, when the firm is impatient, the public bonus may be
used along with subjective bonus pay (that depends on the private subjective evaluations)
but only if the level of surplus destruction associated with the latter is small. If a large
share of the surplus must be eroded in order to provide subjective bonus incentives, then
relational contracts are not sustainable– the firm may actually prefer to renege on its public
bonus promise since it has little to lose in terms of future surplus.
An important feature of our optimal contract is that the worker’s pay is independent of
what he reports about his peer. To better understand this feature, we study a variation of
our model in which the workers’private signals about each other are correlated, and ask
whether a worker’s pay is still independent of his reports. In a setting with correlation, a
worker’s report about his peer contains information about the worker’s own effort, and we
might expect that this information would be used in the optimal contract. However, we find
that even in this setting, in the optimal contract, a worker’s pay may be independent of the
peer report he submits. The firm may disregard some information, as the benefit of using
such information might outweigh by the cost of eliciting it. This finding highlights that
the nature of optimal contracting with subjective private peer evaluations is fundamentally
different from optimal contracting with publicly observable signals.
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However, we show that if we allow the agent’s effort to affect the degree of correlation
between the agents’private signals, then an agent’s pay may depend on his submitted peer
report. To see the intuition, suppose that the signals are perfectly correlated when both
agents work, but uncorrelated when at least one of them shirks. Then, the firm can detect
shirking by simply checking whether there is a mismatch between the two agents’reports.
By rewarding the agents only when their reported evaluations match (rather than solely
based on their peer evaluations), the firm may be able to offer incentives more effi ciently.
It is also interesting to note that our result on the sparing use of peer evaluations speaks
to the debate in the management literature on the use of peer evaluation in organizations.
Several scholars have observed that peer evaluation, albeit commonplace, is not always used
to determine pay; rather, it is used more commonly for development and training purposes
(see, Pieperl, 1999, and the references therein). The main reason cited is that peer evalu-
ations are often plagued with various forms of rater biases, and, therefore, firms often find
it unsuitable for use in determining compensation (Pieperl, 1999; May and Gueldenzoph,
2006). Our finding is consistent with the empirical evidence on the sparing use of peer eval-
uations in determining compensation, but we provide a different rationale that is derived
from the firm’s optimal contracting problem. This result is also reminiscent of the findings
in the subjective evaluation literature on individual-worker compensation that justify wage
compression (MacLeod, 2003; Fuchs, 2007). Our finding indicates that such wage compres-
sion is a feature of the optimal contract even in a more general environment with multiple
workers and peer evaluation.
Related literature: Starting with Telser (1980), a vast literature on relational contracts
has flourished over the last few decades. The early contributions in this literature typically
assume a public but non-verifiable performance signal and highlight how repeated inter-
action may alleviate moral hazard even in the absence of court-enforceable contracts (see
Malcomson, 2010, for a survey). More recently, some authors have focused on private or
subjective evaluations (Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003; Fuchs, 2007; Chan and Zheng, 2011;
Maestri, 2012), though most consider a single-worker framework and eschew the question of
eliciting the truthful evaluation from the co-workers.
The articles that are most closely related to our analysis are Levin (2003), MacLeod (2003)
and Fuchs (2007). Levin (2003) shows that the optimal contract involves just two pay levels,
and prescribes termination following poor performance. MacLeod (2003) analyzes a static
setting with a single risk-averse agent, and derives the optimal contract when there is a
private (subjective) performance measure. He shows that the optimal contract results in a
more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable (objective) performance measures,
and entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal. Fuchs (2007) considers
a dynamic version of MacLeod’s setting. He characterizes the optimal contract in a finite
horizon, and shows (similar to our setting) that surplus destruction on equilibrium path is
necessary for incentive provision. However, resources are burnt only after the worst possible
realizations. He also provides a partial characterization of the optimal contract in the infinite
horizon where surplus destruction is endogenized through possible termination.
Three salient features distinguish our setting from these articles: First, we consider a
multiple agent setting. Second, we allow both public and private performance measures.
Third, and perhaps most substantively, the private information on performance must be
collected from the workers by giving them adequate incentive for truthful reporting. This
feature gives rise to an interaction between the agent’s incentives for effort exertion and
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his incentives for truthful reporting– an interaction that is absent in the environments of
Levin, MacLeod, or Fuchs. A key contribution of our article is to illustrate how the interplay
between these two incentives affects contracting. In particular, we characterize the optimal
contract to show how relational contracts based on publicly observed performance measures
may be used to supplement incentives based on the private peer evaluations.5 Although the
nature of contracting in our setting is substantively different, it has some familiar features–
the firm uses the private signal sparingly as such incentive payments must involve surplus
destruction, and, consequently, the optimal contract leads to wage compression.
There is a sizeable literature on relational contracting with multiple agents that studies
how relational contracting affects rent allocation among agents (Calzolari and Spagnolo,
2009; Board, 2011; Andrews and Barron, 2014; Barron and Powell, 2014), the structure of
ownership (Rayo 2007), and task assignment (Mukherjee and Vasconcelos, 2011; Ishihara,
2013). Our article is more closely related to articles that focus on how relational contracting
affects the form of compensation (Che and Yoo, 2001; Levin, 2002; Kvaløy and Olsen,
2006; Baldenius and Glover, 2010; and Kim and Vikander, 2013). We contribute to this
literature by allowing the principal to elicit private information from the agents through
peer evaluation. We show that the principal can use the peer evaluation to its advantage
even if some information is ignored so as to induce truthful reporting from the agents.
Some aspects of our environment are reminiscent of a few other articles in the incentive
theory literature. The double-deviation issue discussed above also crops up in some models
of delegated expertise, e.g., Gromb and Martimort (2007) (also see Malcomson, 2009). They
consider a setting where a decision-maker hires experts to exert effort in order to obtain
(private) signals about the optimal decision. The key question is how to provide optimal
incentive for signal acquisition. As signal acquisition is private, an expert may deviate both
in his effort choice and in his report of the signal. In contrast to our analysis, Gromb
and Martimort assume verifiable reports (and decision outcomes) and analyze the issue of
collusion between the players.
Our analysis also bears resemblance to Baker, et. al (1994) who study the interaction
between explicit contracts based on verifiable measures and relational contracts based on non-
verifiable measures.6 In contrast to Baker, et al. where performance measures are publicly
observable, agents in our setting have private information about each other’s performance.
Therefore, the optimal contract must also induce truthful revelation of information.
Finally, this article is linked, though somewhat tangentially, to the literature on commu-
nity enforcement in an anonymous random matching setting. While the economic question
is different, a key issue in community enforcement is truthful communication of information.
The seminal papers by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) highlight the diffi culty with en-
abling transmission of information about past play. In their setting, players do not want
to punish deviators (and thereby communicate information about off-path play) in order to
prevent contagion and breakdown of cooperation. Recent work by Deb (2012) uses belief-
free ideas and block strategies to address the issue of truthful revelation of information in
the random matching setting, when players can send cheap talk messages before play. Also
5Marx and Squintani (2009) consider a similar environment with peer monitoring. However, they are
interested in a different question: They ask how agents can be motivated to undertake costly monitoring
activity in order to implement the first-best action.
6Also see MacLeod and Malcomson (1989).
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related is the article by Lippert and Spagnolo (2011) who study word-of-mouth communi-
cation in games played over a network, and consider the incentives of agents to truthfully
report soft information about past play.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a baseline model of
subjective performance evaluation in which informative and productive roles are played by
separate workers. Section 3 discusses the optimal contract in this setting. A general model
with no separation of roles is presented in section 4. Section 5 characterizes the optimal
contract in this setting. In section 6, we consider an environment in which the private
and public subjective measures are correlated. Section 7 discusses some of our modeling
assumptions. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. A baseline model
In this section we present a simple model of hierarchy in the spirit of Tirole (1986) where
a firm hires two workers– a manager and an agent. The agent exerts effort to produce an
output while the manager’s only role is to collect information on the agent’s performance
and convey it to the firm. It turns out that, in this setting the first-best can be achieved
even in the static one-period game. Hence, in what follows, we only focus on a stage game.
We will present a repeated game later when considering a more general model.
The game is described in terms of three components: technology, contracts, and payoffs.
Technology: A principal, or a firm, F , hires a manager M and an agent A (or “subor-
dinate”) to work in a given project. The project outcome, or the output, Y ∈ {y1, ..., yN}
depends only on the agent’s effort eA ∈ {0, 1}. Effort is costly and privately observed by
the agent, giving rise to a moral hazard problem. The cost of effort is c if eA = 1 and 0
otherwise. The outcome Y may be conceived as a measure of the project’s success, where
y1 < y2 < ... < yN , and
(1) Pr (Y = yj | eA) =
{
αj if eA = 1
βj otherwise.
We assume that Y is publicly observable but not verifiable and is realized only at the end
of the game.
Before the output is realized (but after the agent makes his effort choice), the manager
obtains a noisy signal sM ∈ S = {1, ..., n} about the agent’s effort. Upon receiving the
signal, the manager privately reports her signal to the firm. Let
(2) Pr (sM = s | eA) =
{
ps if eA = 1
qs otherwise.
The signal sM is a private signal of the manager: It is unverifiable, and also not observed
by the other players (or any third party). As the signal sM is private and noisy, one can
interpret M’s report on A as her subjective evaluation of her subordinate’s performance.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of reports sent by the manager coincide
with the set of signals.
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j=1 βj = 1, and αj/βj > αk/βk for




s∈S qs = 1, and ps/qs > pr/qr for
any s > r. That is, both Y and sM satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).
Finally, (iii) we assume that the set of signals {Y, sM} are mutually independent conditional
on effort.
Contracts. The firm promises individual contracts to the manager and the agent. Both
contracts specify payments based on the private report sent by the manager, s, and the
public output, Y . Let wMs (Y ) and w
A
s (Y ) be the payments to the manager and the agent
respectively. In addition, the manager’s contract specifies a reporting strategy (m : S → S)
and the agent’s contract specifies the effort levels (e) required of him.
As the manager’s report is private, note that the firm’s total payout to the agent cannot
depend on the manager’s report. Otherwise, the firm would always claim to have received
a report that minimizes its payout. In addition, public output is non-verifiable and hence,
the firm’s payout cannot vary with it either. The total payroll expense of the firm must
therefore be a constant. We assume that the firm commits to a total payroll expense w. As
the combined payment received by the manager and the agent cannot exceed the committed
payroll expense, we have wMs (Y )+w
A
s (Y ) ≤ w for all Y and s. When wMs (Y )+wAs (Y ) < w,
we assume that the firm gives the remaining sum (i.e., w−wMs −wAs ) to a disinterested third
party. The use of this type of “money-burning”contracts dates back to at least Eswaran and
Kotwal (1984)7 and is commonly used in similar environments; e.g., See MacLeod (2003).
A contract in the stage game is completely characterized by the tuple φ = {e,m,w,
wAs (Y ), w
M
s (Y )}. Let Φ be the set of all such contracts.
Payoffs. We assume that all players are risk-neutral. Thus, the expected payoff of the
firm is π := E [Y | eA] − w. The expected payoff of the manager and the agent are uM :=
E
[
wMs (Y ) | eA, m
]
and uA := E
[
wAs (Y ) | eA, m
]
−ceA, respectively. Let the outside options
for all players be 0.
Time line. The game proceeds as follows:
• Beginning of stage 1. Firm offers contract φ ∈ Φ.
• Stage 1.1. Manager and the agent accept or reject. If both players accept, the game
continues to the next stage.
• Stage 1.2. The agent exerts effort eA.
• Stage 1.3. The manager privately obtain signal sM and privately sends her evaluation
s to the firm.
• Stage 1.4. Output Y is realized.
• End of Stage 1. Transfers paid to the agents and the game ends.
Strategies and Equilibrium. The strategy of the agent A has two components: Given the
contract offered, he must choose (i) whether to accept or reject the contract and (ii) an
effort level eA. The strategy of the manager M involves a choice to (i) accept or reject the
contract, and (ii) a reporting strategy mM : S → S. Finally, the firm’s strategy is to choose
a contract φ ∈ Φ. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept.
To characterize the optimal contract, by virtue of Revelation Principle, we focus on equi-
libria in which the manager always reports her signal truthfully, i.e., m(s) = s for all s ∈ S.
7We thank Jim Malcomson for pointing this reference to us.
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3. The optimal contract under baseline model
We begin our analysis by first delineating the firm’s optimal contracting problem. We
focus on the case where the first-best allocation requires the agent to induce effort, as the
case of no effort is trivial. So, the firm’s problem is to maximize its payoff when eA = 1,
subject to a set of participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
First, as mentioned earlier, any contract based on peer evaluation involves a commitment
from the firm to pay out a fixed sum w in payroll expenses irrespective of the output and the
manager’s reports. So, the total payroll expense must satisfy the following budget constraint:
(B) w ≥ wMs (Y ) + wAs (Y ) ∀ s ∈ S and Y ∈ {y1, ..., yN} .
Second, as we are limiting attention to direct mechanisms (by the Revelation Principle), the
contract should induce the manager to report her signals truthfully. Thus, we must have the
following truth-telling constraint on the equilibrium path:
(T ) EY
[




wMs′ (Y ) | eA = 1, sM = s
]
. ∀s and s′ ∈ S
Third, the contract should make it optimal for the agent to exert effort (rather than shirk).
So, we must have:
(IC) E{Y,s}
[
wAs (Y ) | eA = 1
]
− c ≥ E{Y,s}
[
wAs (Y ) | eA = 0
]
.
Finally, the contract offered must ensure participation by each player; i.e., we have:
(IRA) uA = E{Y,s}
[
wAs (Y ) | eA = 1
]
− c ≥ 0,
and
(IRM) uM = E{Y,s}
[
wMs (Y ) | eA = 1
]
≥ 0.
Denote v = E [Y | eA = 1] . Thus, the firm’s optimal contracting problem is given as follows:
maxφ∈Φ π = v − w
s.t. (B) , (T ) , (IC) , (IRA) , and (IRM) .
Proposition 1. (Optimal contract under baseline model) The optimal contract induces
first best. Under the optimal contract, (i) the firm commits to a payroll expense ŵ = c, (ii)
the manager reports truthfully and receives the transfer:
ŵMs (Y ) =
 −∆M if Y = yN and s = 1∆A if Y = y1 and s = 1
0 otherwise
,
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and (iii) the agent exerts effort and receives the transfer:
ŵAs (Y ) =
 c+ ∆M if Y = yN and s = 1c−∆A if Y = y1 and s = 1c otherwise ,
where ∆M = α1c/q1 (αNβ1 − α1βN) and ∆A = αNc/q1 (αNβ1 − α1βN).
Proposition 1 shows that under the optimal contract, both the manager and the agent
earn a fixed compensation except in two cases: (i) when both the output and the manager’s
evaluation are at their lowest, and (ii) the manager sends the worst evaluation but the output
is at its highest level.
When both the output and the manager’s report are the worst possible ones, the agent
is punished and his “penalty”, ∆A, is transferred to the manager. While such an incentive
scheme does not require money burning, it distorts the manager’s truth-telling incentive–
the manager is now always tempted to report the worst evaluation for the agent. To ensure
truth-telling from the manager, the contract punishes her if the output is the best possible
one in spite of her report being the worst, and, as before, her penalty, ∆M , is transferred
to the agent. Now, one can choose values of these penalties such that the manager, in
expectation, earns the same expected payoff for all evaluations that she may send and the
agent’s expected payoff from exerting effort is at least as much as his payoff from shirking.
There are two important features of this contract: first, the contract achieves first best
as punishment does not require money burning; whenever a player is punished, a transfer
is made from the punished player to the other one. This observation has an immediate im-
plication in a repeated game setting: even if the firm can offer a relational contracts based
on the publicly observed output, such an incentive mechanism would be redundant. Sec-
ond, contrary to the commonly observed compensation policies, the manager’s compensation
depends on her evaluation of the agent.
To see why the contract is effective in inducing effort, notice that it essentially induces
a lottery between the manager and the agent. The lottery has zero expected payoff for
both the manager and the agent if he puts in effort. When the agent shirks, however, he
has negative expected payoff from the lottery. So he is willing to put in effort because it
improves his expected payoff.
Next, to see why this contract may not be adopted in practice, notice that a key re-
quirement for the contract to work is that the manager cannot affect the distribution of the
output. If the manager’s effort also matters for output, however, this contract provides a
perverse incentive to the manager: The manager can increase her expected payoff from the
contract if the worst output becomes more likely. The manager therefore prefers to sabotage
the agent’s effort under this contract, and this may be part of the reason why the contract
is rarely, if ever observed. In practice, the manager’s role typically goes beyond evaluating
the agent. From making plans to assigning tasks, from learning about the client’s demand
to monitoring the worker’s behavior, the manager takes a number of actions that matter for
the success of the project. When the effort of the manager matters, what form does the
optimal contract take? We analyze this question in the next section.
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4. A general model
We now assume that both workers exert productive effort and play an informative role
by evaluating each other’s performance. We will see that the optimal contract substantially
differs from the baseline discussed above. For analytical tractability and a streamlined
exposition, we do not explicitly model the organizational hierarchy and treat the manager and
the agent in a symmetric fashion. So, we can also interpret the workers’reports as subjective
peer evaluation. To simplify notation, in what follows, we will denote the workers as agents
A1 and A2. All players are assumed to be long-lived, and in each period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, they
play the following stage game that is a slightly general version of our baseline model.
stage game: At the start of every period, the stage game begins with the firm F offering
individual contracts to the two agents. For sake of brevity, we only elaborate on the aspects
of the game that are different from our baseline model. Also, for expositional clarity, we
suppress the time index t for all variables unless mentioned otherwise.
Technology. We allow for both agents to exert effort and assume that each player receives
and reports information about the other. Each agent (privately) exerts effort ei ∈ {0, 1}
in the project where the cost of effort is c if ei = 1 and 0 otherwise. The project outcome
Y ∈ Y = {y1, ..., yN} is publicly realized at the end of the period and depends on the effort
profile e = (e1, e2) where
(1′) Pr (Y = yj | e) =
 αj if e = (1, 1)βj if e = (0, 1) or (1, 0)γj otherwise .
The above technology specification captures a wide range of production environments. For
example, when βj > γj our setting allows the efforts to be substitutes, and if βj = γj, the
efforts are purely complementary in the spirit of team production. Also note that as we are
interested in implementing the effort profile e = (1, 1), γj plays no role in our analysis.
The signal on peer-evaluation is assumed to have the same structure as in our initial
model. Before the team output is realized (and after the agents make their effort choices),
each agent Ai privately obtains a noisy signal si, about his co-worker A−i’s performance or
contribution to the project, and privately reports his signal to the firm. Let
(2′) Pr (si = s | e−i) =
{
ps if e−i = 1
qs otherwise.
Wemaintain Assumption 1 (i) and 1 (ii), and unless mentioned otherwise, the set of signals
{Y, s1, s2} are assumed to be mutually independent conditional on effort.
Contracts. In each period, the firm offers a contract to each of the two agents. The contract
specifies the effort levels (e) required of the agents, the reporting strategies (m = (m1,m2) ),
and the transfer payments. In contrast to the baseline model, the transfer payment to an
agent Ai not only depends on the peer evaluation s sent by Ai about his co-worker and
the public output Y , but also on the peer evaluation r received by the firm about Ai from
co-worker A−i.
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As before, the firm commits to a payroll expense w and offers a payment wirs(Y ) such that
w1rs(Y ) + w
2
sr(Y ) ≤ w for all r, s and Y . Money is “burnt”whenever w1rs(Y ) + w2sr(Y ) <
w. We call the payments wirs(Y ) subjective performance bonus in order to emphasize their
dependence on the subjective peer evaluations.
But in contrast to the baseline model, in addition to the subjective performance bonus,
the firm also promises a public performance bonus B(Y ) ≥ 0 for the team that depends only
on the publicly observable team output Y . As the team output (Y ) is non-verifiable, the
bonus payment is offered as a relational contract (à la Bull, 1987) that is sustained through
the threat of future retaliation of the agents should the firm renege on its promise. Let
bi(Y ) be the bonus promised to agent Ai and, without loss of generality, we assume that
b1(Y ) + b2(Y ) = B(Y ) (i.e., the sum of the bonus of each agent is equal to the firm’s total
promised bonus).
For tractability, we limit attention to symmetric contracts. We assume that b1 (Y ) =
b2 (Y ) = b (Y ) and w1rs (Y ) = w
2
rs (Y ) = wrs (Y ) for all Y , r and s. A contract in the stage
game is completely characterized by the tuple φ = {e,m, w, b (Y ) , wrs (Y )}. Let Φ∗ be the
set of all such contracts.
Notice that our setup is equivalent to a setting in which the agent’s pay includes both
a fixed contractible “salary” and a nonnegative discretionary pay that depends on the
subjective reports and the publicly observable output. To see the equivalence, consider
the general setting where W irs (Y ) is the total payment received by the agent Ai. Define
ωi = minr,s,Y W
i
rs (Y ). In other words, ω
i is the minimal payment that the firm commits to
agent Ai, and it can be interpreted as the his base wage, or “salary.”The total bonus of Ai
is then Birs (Y ) = W
i
rs (Y ) − ωi ≥ 0. Note that we decompose Birs (Y ) into two parts: (i)
a “public signal”-based component bi (Y ) = minr,sBirs (Y ) that depends only on Y that is
equivalent to the public performance bonus defined earlier, and (ii) a subjective component
Birs (Y ) − bi (Y ) that also depends on the subjective reports. This subjective component
of bonus along with the fixed salary is defined above as the subjective performance bonus,
i.e., wirs (Y ) = ω
i + [Birs (Y )− bi (Y )]. We explicitly consider these two components of the
discretionary pay to clearly highlight the interplay between the incentives based on pub-
lic signal and the incentives based on subjective peer evaluation. Finally, we can define
w = maxr,s,Y {w1rs (Y ) + w2sr (Y )}, and this is the payroll expense the firm commits to.
Payoffs. We continue to assume that all players are risk-neutral and their outside option is
0. Given the contract, the expected payoffof the firm is π := E [Y | e]−(w + 2E [b (Y ) | e,m]) ,
and the expected payoff of agent Ai is ui := E[b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) | e,m]− cei.
Repeated game: The stage game above is repeated in every period. All players have a
common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The public history of period t is given by the tuple
ht = {φ, Y, b̂}t where b̂ is the bonus paid in period t. Let the (public) history in period t be
ht = {{φ, Y, b̂}τ | τ = 1, ..., t− 1} and let H t be the set of all (public) histories in period t.
Strategies and Equilibrium. As the peer evaluations are private, our model presents an
infinitely repeated game with private monitoring. A technical challenge in analyzing such
games is that they lack a recursive structure and the characterization of the equilibrium payoff
set appears intractable (Kandori, 2002). Hence, in order to analyze the optimal contract while
maintaining tractability we restrict the class of strategies.
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Specifically, we allow strategies to depend on the full public history (all past team outputs
and bonus payments as well as the current period’s team output), and the most recent private
history (private reports or private signals in the current period). Therefore, the strategy of
an agent Ai has three components: in each period, given the public history and the current
contract, (i) a contract acceptance decision: H t × Φ∗ → {accept, reject}, (ii) an effort
choice ei : H t × Φ∗ → {0, 1} and (iii) a reporting strategy that also depends on effort level:
H t×Φ∗×{0, 1} →Mi whereMi is the set of all functions mi : S → S that maps Ai’s private
signal on A−i’s performance in the current period into the set of reports. The firm’s strategy
is to choose in each period (i) a contract given the public history of the game: H t → Φ∗, (ii)
a public performance bonus b̂ given the public history of the game and the publicly observed
output in the current period: H t × Y → R+, and (iii) a subjective performance bonus ŵrs,
which may depend on the public history, current period’s (public) output, and the private
reports received from the agents in the current period: H t × Y × S × S → R.
Our class of equilibria is extremely similar in spirit to semi-public equilibria used in earlier
literature by Compte (1998) and Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011). Semi-public equilibria
are defined for repeated games with communication, and require that equilibrium actions
depend only on the public history, and messages depend on the public history and the most
recent private history. In our setting, the agents’effort decision and the principal’s bonus
payout depend only on the public history, but the agents’reports and principal’s subjective
bonus payments can depend on the most recent private information.
We consider this article as a first step in understanding the use of private peer evaluations
in incentive provision, by allowing subjective performance bonus to depend only on the most
recent private reports. But it is worthwhile to point out that restricting attention to such
equilibria is not without loss of generality. For instance, this restriction implies that players
cannot condition their actions on their complete private history. In particular, this rules
out the possibility where the principal reviews the agents’performance over a pre-specified
length of time rather than in every period (e.g., “T -period review”strategies as in Fuchs,
2007), or cases where the agent may withhold effort due to past disagreements on subjective
performance bonus.
To characterize the optimal equilibria, by virtue of Revelation Principle, we continue to
focus on equilibria in which the agents always report their signals truthfully, i.e., mi(s) = s
for all i and s. We also assume that following a publicly observable deviation (i.e., if b̂ 6= b (Y )
for some agent for some period t and some public signal Y ), all players take their outside
options forever. This assumption is without loss of generality because the outside options
give all players their minmax payoffs (Abreu, 1988). Notice that there is another static Nash
equilibrium that gives all players 0: The firm pays out a wage of 0 under all contingencies
and neither agents puts in effort. Since both options yield the same payoffs to all players
and do not affect the structure of the optimal contract, either option can be chosen.8
8An alternative modeling choice is to assume that the parties switch to the optimal subjective contracts
following a publicly observed deviation (see, e.g., Baker, et. al 1994). The main results of the model remain
unaltered under this alternative assumption. However, we have not opted for this assumption because it is
conceptually less appealing. Specifically, once the firm commits to a payroll expense, subsequent surplus
destruction hurts only the agents and not the firm. As a result, the agents may be concerned that more
surplus is destroyed than what is specified in the contract. Such a concern is especially relevant if the firm
has deviated from equilibrium in the past. Therefore, following a public deviation, the agents may prefer
their outside options to the optimal subjective contracts.
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5. The optimal contract under the general model
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We first revisit the firm’s contracting problem and
highlight how it differs from its baseline model. Next, we discuss the stage game equilibrium
and illustrate why first best need not be feasible in this setting. Finally, we characterize the
optimal contract in the repeated game.
5.1. The firm’s problem. We focus on the case in which it is optimal for the firm to induce
effort. It is straightforward to establish that, within our class of equilibria, there is no loss
of generality in restricting attention to stationary relational contracts where the contract
{e,w, b (Y ) , wrs (Y )} is invariant over time.9 Therefore, the optimal contract maximizes the
firm’s per-period payoff, π, subject to a set of participation and incentive constraints.
As in our baseline model, the optimal contract must satisfy the budget constraint (B′)
(for the firm), truth-telling (T ′) and participation constraints (IR′) (for both agents) given
as follows:
(B′) w ≥ wrs (Y ) + wsr (Y ) ∀Y ∈ Y , and r, s ∈ S.
(T ′) E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) |e = 1, si = s] ≥ E{Y,r} [wrs′ (Y ) | e = 1, si = s] ∀s and s′ ∈ S.
and
(IR′) ui = E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) | e = 1]− c ≥ 0, ∀i.
While these three constraints closely parallel their counterparts in the baseline model, there
are two other constraints that sharply differ from our earlier analysis.
First, the incentive-compatibility constraint significantly differs from that of the canonical
moral hazard problem. We must now take into account the fact that, after shirking, the
agent may find it optimal to not report his signal truthfully. In other words, a deviation in
effort provision may be coupled with a deviation in the peer evaluation reporting strategy.
The incentive constraint below reflects the fact that, conditional on shirking, the agent
will always report the signal that maximizes his expected payoff. As we will see later,
this potential “double deviation”plays a critical role in the characterization of the optimal
contract. The incentive constraint can be written as:
(IC ′) E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) | e = 1]− c ≥ max
s′
E{Y,r} [b (Y ) + wrs′ (Y ) | ei = 0, e−i = 1] .
Second, the use the public performance bonus introduces an additional constraint on the
firm. As the bonus payment is sustained through the threat of future punishment, it must
be the case that the firm’s payoff from honoring its bonus promise exceeds its payoff from
reneging on it. Therefore, we must have the following dynamic enforcement constraint:10
9The formal proof is available from the authors. It uses a line of argument very similar to that used by
Levin (2003) to prove optimality of stationary contracts within the class of public perfect equilibria.
10Recall that the contract is assumed to be symmetric. So, for any yj the aggregate bonus promise
B (yj) = 2b (yj).
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(DE)
δ
1− δπ ≥ maxj 2b (yj) .
The firm’s payoff from reneging is obtained from two observations: First, since both agents
trigger punishment if the firm “cheats”either of the two agents, if the firm decided to renege
on its promise, it would renege with both agents. Second, we have assumed that if the firm
reneges, off the equilibrium path, the agents do not exert any effort and the firm and the
agents earn their outside options of 0.
Thus, the firm’s optimal contracting problem is:
P :
 maxφ∈Φ
∗ π = v − {w + 2E [b (Y ) | e = 1]}
s.t. (B′) , (T ′) , (DE) , (IC ′) , and (IR′) .
(With a slight abuse of notation, we continue to denote v = E [Y | e = 1].) Note that at the
optimum, the participation constraints of both agents must bind. Otherwise, the firm can
reduce b (Y ) by a small positive amount for all Y and increase its payoff without violating
any constraints. Thus, we can use (IR′) to eliminate E [b (Y ) | e] in the firm’s objective
function. Consequently, the firm’s objective function reduces to the total surplus generated
by the relationship, i.e.,
π = {v − 2c} −
{
w − 2E{Y,r,s} [wrs (Y ) | e = 1]
}
.
Denote z := w− 2E{r,s,Y } [wrs (Y ) | e = 1], i.e., the surplus that is “destroyed”(in expecta-
tion) on equilibrium path when the firm relies on the peer evaluation. The firm’s problem
can be conceived as one of minimizing z subject to the set of constraints given in program
P; i.e., we can reformulate the problem as:
P ′ :
 minφ∈Φ
∗ z = w − 2E{Y,r,s} [wrs (Y ) | e = 1]
s.t. (B′) , (T ′) , (DE) , (IC ′) , and (IR′) .
The optimal contract is the solution to the above program.
5.2. The stage game equilibria. In order to characterize the optimal contract in the re-
peated game, we first characterize the equilibrium in the stage game in which effort is induced
through subjective performance bonus. This characterization turns out to be informative
about the repeated game as well. The optimal contract in the stage game must solve the
firm’s program that is obtained by setting b (Y ) = 0 ∀Y in the program P ′. The following
proposition characterizes the optimal contract in the stage game.
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Proposition 2. (Optimal contract in stage game) In the optimal contract that induces





and the agent’s compensation is given by:









Observe two key features of the optimal contract above. First, the compensation of an
agent, Ai, depends only on his co-worker A−i’s report– what Ai reports on his co-worker’s
performance does not affect his own compensations. This, in particular, implies that it is
incentive-compatible for each agent to report the signal about his co-worker’s performance
truthfully. Notice that in the optimal contract, the firm gives up the opportunity to sharpen
incentives using relative and/or joint performance evaluation (see, for instance, Che and Yoo,
2001). We return to this issue later.
Second, the agents receive the entire committed payroll expense, except in the case where
both the public and private signals are the worst possible ones– i.e., the team output is at its
lowest and the agent gets the worst possible peer evaluation. To see the intuition, note that
the optimal contract minimizes the amount of surplus destruction needed to induce effort.
This is achieved by punishing the agent only when both public and private signals indicate
the worst performance. As this signal is least likely to be realized when the agent is exerting
effort, the above contract minimizes surplus destruction in equilibrium while still giving the
agent suffi cient incentive to exert effort.
This finding is consistent with the observation in the management literature that firms
often do not use peer evaluations to determine pay but, rather, use them as inputs for staff
training and developmental initiatives (Budman and Rice, 1994; Pieperl, 1999). While this
literature cites inherent biases in peer evaluations as the key reason behind this observation
(May and Gueldenzoph, 2006), our finding highlights that in some contracting environments,
such sparing use of peer evaluation (in determining workers’pay) may indeed be the optimal
compensation policy.
Our result also echoes the findings in the literature on the single-worker compensation
with subjective evaluation. In these models, the worker is “punished”only when the firm
obtains the signal that is most informative of shirking (i.e., the signal least likely to arise
when agents exert effort). In other words, the worker’s pay remains constant under all
other signal realizations. This type of wage compression arises both in a static setting à la
MacLeod (2003) and in a dynamic setting à la Fuchs (2007).
It is important to note an important difference between our setting and those discussed
above: In our setting the contract must simultaneously address the agents’moral hazard in
signal reporting and effort provision. Indeed, less surplus could be destroyed in equilibrium
if an agent was paid based on both the report he receives and the report he sends. For
example, when an agent receives a bad report but sends a good one, he could be punished,
and the penalty is paid to the other agent. However, such a contract fails to generate an
adequate incentive for effort provision because an agent can shirk and then avoid punishment
by lying on his report (i.e., sending a bad report on his co-worker). As mentioned earlier, an
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optimal contract in our setting must account for such “double deviations”where a deviation
in effort provision may be coupled with a deviation in the peer evaluation reporting strategy.
This observation highlights the critical difference between the subjective (i.e., private)
and objective (i.e., public) peer-evaluation. If the signal on peer-evaluation, si, is public,
the double deviation problem does not arise and the firm can attain the first-best by using
a contract that parallels the optimal contract in our baseline model. Thus, the subjectivity
of the peer-evaluation necessarily compromises the effi ciency of the optimal contract. And
as we will see later, these characteristics of the optimal contract in the stage game continue
to hold in the repeated game as well.
Observe that the expected surplus destruction under the optimal contract (in Proposition
2) is given by











Specifically, if the above condition fails, then the unique stage game equilibrium is the
one with no effort exertion. Otherwise, there exist multiple equilibria: one in which the
agents do not exert any effort, and another where the firm induces effort using subjective
performance bonus as described in Proposition 2. We state this formally in the proposition
below (we omit the proof as it is already discussed above).
Proposition 3. (Stage-game Nash equilibria) Suppose that β1q1
α1p1
< v
v−2c . Then there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the stage game in which agents do not exert any effort.
Otherwise, there exist multiple Nash equilibria in the stage game:
(i) In the worst equilibrium for the firm, the agents do not exert effort and all players get
their outside option of 0.
(ii) In the best equilibrium for the firm, agents exert effort and the firm earns v− 2β1q1
β1q1−α1p1
c.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Condition (4) simply states that it is worth-
while for the firm to induce effort through surplus destruction if and only if the performance
signals are suffi ciently precise. That is, the likelihood ratio β1q1/α1p1 for the signal that
triggers money burning (i.e., r = 1, Y = y1) needs to be suffi ciently large. The larger is this
likelihood ratio the more likely it is that the signal r = 1 and Y = y1 is obtained when the
agent shirks rather than exerts effort. Thus, when β1q1/α1p1 is large, it is easier for the firm
to induce effort– a relatively small spread between the reward (for good performance) and
punishment (for poor performance) would induce the agent to exert effort. Consequently,
only a small amount of surplus needs to be destroyed in equilibrium. Thus, the firm may
find it profitable to induce effort through subjective performance bonus. How large does the
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likelihood ratio need to be? Condition (4) specifies the required threshold which is decreasing
in v and increasing in c. This is intuitive as the larger is the value that the workers create
and smaller is the cost of effort, the more likely it is that the surplus generated through
effort outweighs the surplus burnt in inducing effort.
On the other hand, if β1q1/α1p1 is small, then effort exertion has little effect on the
relative likelihood of the worst signals being realized, and the firm must make the spread
in the agent’s compensation suffi ciently large in order to induce effort. This implies that a
considerable amount of surplus must be destroyed and, consequently, the firm’s payoff may
become negative– a scenario in which it is optimal for the firm not to induce effort and earn
its outside option of 0.
5.3. Characterizing the optimal contract in the repeated game. We now use our
understanding of the stage game to solve for the optimal relational contract. Proposition 3
shows that subjective performance bonus is used in a one-shot game if and only if condition
(4) holds. It turns out that the same condition continues to determine whether subjective
performance bonus is used in the repeated setting.
Proposition 4 below characterizes the optimal relational contract. But before we present
the formal statement, it is instructive to summarize three salient implications of this propo-
sition. First, when the firm is patient enough (δ is large), then the optimal incentive scheme
uses only the relational contract: The firm pays a fixed bonus for all public signals above
a certain threshold, and subjective performance bonus is a lump sum that is independent
of the agent’s performance (consequently, there is no surplus destruction on the equilibrium
path). Second, when the firm is relatively impatient (δ is small), then it may use subjective
performance bonus to sharpen effort incentives. But its decision to use subjective perfor-
mance bonus depends on whether condition (4) holds– if condition (4) is violated, (i.e., in
the stage game equilibrium, effort cannot be induced with subjective performance bonus),
then the firm never uses subjective performance bonus to generate effort incentives. Finally,
whenever subjective performance bonus is used to provide incentives, the optimal contract
has features very similar to those in the stage game: An agent is “punished”through low
subjective performance bonus only if both the lowest public output and the lowest private
signal are realized, and an agent’s subjective performance bonus does not depend on the
report he submits about his co-worker.
Proposition 4. (Optimal contract) Let yk∗ denote the lowest value of the team output yj
such that αj > βj. There exists a threshold discount factor δ





v−2c , then (i) subjective performance bonus is not used: w = w
∗ and wrs (Y ) =
w∗/2 for all r, s, and Y ; (ii) Public performance bonus is feasible if and only if δ ≥ δ∗, and
in this case, the public bonus associated with the optimal contract is of the form
b∗ (Y ) =
{
b∗ if Y ≥ yk∗
0 otherwise
,
where b∗ = c/
∑N





v−2c , then (i) for δ ≥ δ
∗, the optimal contract is as described above and both
agents exert effort; (ii) for δ < δ∗, the subjective performance bonus takes the form: w = w∗∗
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and









where ∆ > 0. The public bonus takes the form
b∗ (Y ) =
{
b∗∗ (δ) if Y ≥ yk∗
0 otherwise
,
where b∗∗ (δ) is increasing in δ. Also, both agents exert effort.
Proposition 4 indicates that it is optimal to combine incentives only when the firm is
impatient (δ is low) and the signals (private, public or both) are a sharp measure of the
agents’performance. And as equation (4) suggests, the smaller is the value (v) and the larger
is the cost (c) of effort, the more precise the signals have to be for subjective performance
bonus to be a part of the optimal contract.
Moreover, the subjective performance bonus is used (to punish the agents) only when
the lowest team output is realized and at least one of the agents receives the worst report
from his co-worker. That is, in equilibrium, subjective performance bonus is “compressed”
across both public and private performance measures. This is similar to the results on wage
compression discussed earlier for the static game. Our result shows that wage compression
extends not only to a team-production environment, but also to environments with a richer
set of performance signals that allows for both public and private measures.
To see the intuition behind Proposition 4, notice that providing incentives through sub-
jective performance bonus involves surplus destruction, but no surplus needs to be destroyed
while providing incentives through public bonus payments. However, a public bonus re-
quires the promise to be credible, which, in turn, depends on the future benefits from the
relationship (this is the essence of the dynamic enforcement constraint (DE)). If the firm is
suffi ciently patient (i.e., when δ is high), the future gains from the relationship between the
agents and the firm is high, and the range of credible bonus payments is considerably large.
Specifically, the firm can use public bonus alone to generate suffi ciently strong incentives to
achieve the first best.
However, when the firm is not very patient (i.e., when δ is low), then its ability to offer
large bonus payments is limited. Consequently, the firm will not be able to induce effort
from the worker if it relies only on the bonus payments. In this case, subjective performance
bonus may be used to help induce effort. Notice that in Proposition 4 (part (B)), b∗∗ (δ) is
increasing in δ. This implies that the more impatient the firm is, the more it will rely on the
subjective performance bonus payments to induce effort.
But the subjective performance bonus affects both sides of the (DE) constraint. On
the one hand, subjective performance bonus reduces the public performance bonus amount
necessary to induce effort. This makes (DE) easier to satisfy. On the other hand, subjective
performance bonus leads to surplus destruction, making (DE) harder to satisfy. When
condition (4) holds, the subjective signals are more informative of the peer’s effort. As a
result, the benefit from reducing the public bonus outweighs the cost of surplus destruction,
and, thus, subjective performance bonus can be used to relax (DE).
Notice that the double deviation problem discussed in the context of Proposition 2 (for the
stage-game) continues to be relevant in the repeated setting. In order to minimize surplus
destruction, we might expect that the optimal contract destroys surplus only when the team
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output is the lowest and the peer reports are the worst. Further, surplus destruction might
even be avoided by punishing an agent for poor performance while transferring the penalty
amount to his co-worker. But as discussed earlier, this is not incentive compatible, and
consequently, even in the repeated setting, an agent’s report on his co-worker does not affect
his own pay.
We conclude this section with the following observation: As the agents get the same
payoff irrespective of the reports they send, it may appear that the agents may collude in
their reporting strategy by always sending good reports for each other. While collusion
remains an important issue, notice that such a reporting strategy may be counterproductive
for an agent as it would encourage his partner to shirk and therefore reduces the expected
public performance bonus for the agent himself. To see this, note that under the optimal
contract, both agents are indifferent between working and shirking. If agent A1 always sends
a good report about A2, this will change A2’s payoff, both when he works and when he
shirks. When A2 works, his expected payoff increases by α1p1∆ as his payoff changes only
when Y = y1 and r = 1, which happens with probability α1p1. But, when A2 shirks, such
mis-reporting increases his expected payoff by β1q1∆ > α1p1∆. In other words, if A1 always
covers for A2, A2’s payoffmay be higher when he shirks; hence, A2 might shirk, and, in turn,
lower A1’s expected public performance bonus as the team output is likely to fall. We will
briefly revisit this issue in the conclusion and also in Appendix B.
6. Optimal contracting with correlated signals
A key feature of the optimal contract above is that an agent’s subjective performance bonus
does not depend on his report about his co-worker. This observation is perhaps not surprising
when the private signals are statistically independent (conditional on effort)– an agent’s
report on his co-worker is not informative about his own effort level and making the agent’s
pay independent of his own report trivially ensures truth-telling. But would this finding hold
if the signals are correlated? When signals are correlated, one might expect that an agent’s
subjective performance bonus will depend on his report, as this signal contains information
about his action. In this section, we explore this question and find that even under correlated
signals, an agent’s pay remains independent of his report, unless the presence of correlation
itself depends on the agents’effort level.
6.1. A signal structure with correlation. We consider a variation of our main model
by assuming that the private signals are correlated (conditional on effort). We maintain the
assumption that the public signal is still uncorrelated with both the private signals. To fix
ideas, one can think of the public signal as being generated by an independent source out-
side the team– such as a client satisfaction survey– and, therefore, likely to be statistically
independent of the private signals (conditional on effort) that the agents obtain.
To keep the analysis tractable, we consider a simple binary signal structure à la Fleckinger
(2012). Let the set of private signals be S = {l, h} and let the tuple (r, s) ∈ S × S denote
the event where Ai receives a report r from A−i and sends a report s on A−i. As we are
considering Nash implementation of the effort (ei, e−i) = (1, 1) under truthful reporting, the
tuple (r, s) also represents the event when A−i gets the signal r about Ai and Ai gets the
signal s on A−i. Suppose that the signals may be correlated when both agents exert effort
but are necessarily independent when at least one agent shirks. That is,
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Pr (r, s | (ei, e−i)) =
{
Prs if (ei, e−i) = (1, 1)
Pr (r | ei) Pr (s | e−i) if (ei, e−i) 6= (1, 1)
,
where
Pr (r = h | ei) =
{
p if ei = 1 and e−i = 0
q if ei = 0
,
and
Pr (s = h | e−i) =
{
p if e−i = 1 and ei = 0
q if e−i = 0
.
Assumption 2. Let (i) Prs = Psr and PhhPll − PlhPhl ≥ 0; (ii) p > q; and (iii) P :=
Phh + Phl > q.
The above assumption suggests that (i) when both agents work, the probability distri-
bution over the signals is symmetric and signals are positively correlated; (ii) even when
an agent shirks, the signals are informative; and, (iii) the probability that Ai gets a high
signal (P ) is higher when both workers work compared to when Ai shirks. Note that our
specification indicates that the presence of correlation depends on the agents’efforts– the
signals are positively correlated (e.g., a “common shock”) only if both agents exert effort.
6.2. The optimal contract. The firm’s optimal contracting problem under this altered
signal structure closely mirrors our analysis of the independent signal case. The firm solves
the program P ′ where the probability distribution over the private signals (r, s) is the one
given above. We state in Proposition 5 the optimal contract in the stage game. This
result not only pins down the firm’s payoff, but also highlights how the optimal subjective
performance bonus depends on the underlying correlation structure. Using this result, we
then derive the optimal contract in the repeated game in Proposition 6.
Proposition 5. (Optimal stage game contract under correlated signals) The optimal
contract in the stage game is characterized as follows. There exist ŵc and w̄c, such that the
following holds:
(A) If Plh > (1− P ) q, then w = ŵc and
wrs (Y ) =
{ 1
2





(B) If Plh ≤ (1− P ) q, then w = w̄c. For Y = y1,




w̄c −∆l1 if (r, s) = (l, h)
1
2











1 = c/ (β1q (1− q)− α1Plh); and for Y > y1,




w̄c if (r, s) = (h, h) or (l, l)
w̄c − wsr (Y ) if (r, s) = (h, l) or (l, h)
.
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The proposition above shows that the optimal relational contract takes two possible forms.
Part (A) indicates that as long as
(5)
Plh
1− P > q,
the optimal contract with subjective evaluation takes the same form as in Proposition 2.11
In particular, the report each agent sends does not affect his pay. When condition (5) fails,
Part (B) shows that an agent’s pay is now affected both by the report he receives and the
report he sends. When the reports of the agents do not match, surplus can be destroyed and
the agents are punished. The intuition is that the firm can induce effort from the agents by
comparing their reports. Specifically, the agents’reports are more likely to be aligned when
they both exert effort. Therefore, by punishing the agent for a mismatch of reports, the firm
induces each agent to exert effort.
In this setting, there are two ways of detecting shirking. On the one hand, a worker is
more likely to have shirked if the co-worker sends a bad report about him. On the other
hand, the worker is more likely to have shirked if his report does not match the report of the
co-worker. Condition (5) reflects how the optimal contract combines these two channels that
indicate shirking. Recall P is the probability that the co-worker sends a good report. The
left hand side of condition (5) is therefore the conditional probability of report mismatch
(when both workers put in effort) given that the co-worker sends a bad signal. When this
conditional probability is small, it implies that reports from the workers are unlikely to be
different when both put in effort. As a result, punishing the workers by a mismatch of reports
is more effective when the left hand side is of (5) is smaller. The right hand side of condition
(5) is the probability that report from the co-worker is good when the worker has shirked.
As a result, the smaller is q, the more effective it is to detect shirking from a bad report.
In summary, when it is more effective to detect shirking from a bad report, the optimal
contract takes the same form as that in our analysis with independent signals. Otherwise,
the optimal contract detects shirking by comparing reports. When effort does not induce
signal correlation, i.e., Plh = Phl = (1− P )P , condition (5) is always satisfied (as P > q by
assumption) and the contract continues to disregard Ai’s report about A−i while determining
Ai’s pay. But this observation holds even when there is correlation between the signals as
long as the correlation is not too strong (i.e., if Plh remains large).
It is interesting to compare this finding with Fleckinger (2012) who analyzes the case of
public performance measures, and shows that as long as the degree of correlation varies with
effort levels, an agent’s compensation under the optimal contract depends both on his own
as well as his co-worker’s performance (this result echoes the “informativeness principle”à
la Holmström, 1979). Our result indicates that under subjective performance measure, even
if the on- and off-equilibrium signal correlations are different, an agent’s compensation is
independent of his co-worker’s performance unless the signal correlation in equilibrium is
significantly strong. This is due to the fact that while using subjective signals the contract
must induce the agents to truthfully report their signals and address the double-deviation
problem. And if the compensation depends on relative performance, an agent always has an
11Notice that since the signals are binary, (1− q) corresponds to the notation q1 in our main model
(similarly (1− P ) corresponds to p1).
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incentive to manipulate his report which might be too costly to mitigate unless the correlation
between signals are suffi ciently high.
When the principal uses the relative performance to reward the agents, the optimal con-
tract (Part (B)) has two noticeable features. First, surplus is again destroyed only when
the public output is at its lowest level, and the intuition for this is the same as that in the
case of independent signals discussed earlier. The expected surplus loss is minimized when
surplus is destroyed only when the public signal is the worst– the signal least likely to arise
on the equilibrium path.
Second, the agent’s pay may depend on his report about the co-worker even if the public
signal is not at its lowest level (i.e., Y > y1). This dependence arises because the public
output can be used to soften the double-deviation problem (when the optimal contract pays
the agent by comparing their reports). Notice that the double-deviation problem takes the
following form. Suppose the agent shirks and is likely to receive a bad report. The agent
may then prefer to send a bad report to increase the chance of matching the report of the
co-worker. In absence of any public signals, the potential double-deviation exacerbates the
amount of surplus destruction– under the optimal contract the agent strictly prefers to send
a bad report after he shirks. But when a public signal is available, the principal can design
the contract so that after the agent shirks, he is indifferent between sending a bad report and
a good one. In other words, the availability of public signal lowers the agent’s incentive to
misreport, and therefore, lowers the amount of surplus destruction needed to induce effort.
Specifically, the optimal contract uses a similar idea as that in Proposition 1– the public
output can be used to create a lottery so that when the agent shirks, his payoff from sending
a bad report is negative (relative to sending a good report) if the public output is at its
lowest level, but it is positive otherwise. And the lottery has a zero expected value so that
when the agent shirks, he is indifferent from sending a bad report and a good one. However,
notice that unlike the optimal contract in Proposition 1, the lottery must also ensure that,
if the agent works, he also has the incentive to tell the truth. This additional constraint
complicates the design of the lottery, and the exact form of the contract is described in the
proof of Proposition 5.
Next, we characterize the optimal relational contract with correlated signals. It is instruc-
tive to calculate the associated level of surplus destruction for each type of contract, and
routine calculation gives that:
ẑc =
 2α1 (1− P ) c/ (β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P )) if Plh > (1− P ) q2α1Plhc/ (β1q (1− q)− α1Plh) otherwise .
(We use the subscript c to indicate that the signals are correlated.) The following remarks
are in order. First, if the private signals are not perfectly correlated (i.e., Plh > 0), there is
always surplus destruction in equilibrium. Second, under perfect correlation (i.e., Plh = 0),
the optimal contract achieves the first best: it induces effort without requiring any surplus
destruction. This finding is similar in spirit to the finding by MacLeod (2003). MacLeod
shows that when the principal and the agent observe the same signal, the truth-telling
constraint is trivially satisfied and there are no agency costs associated with the use of
subjective evaluations. Our finding shows that this remains the case even with subjective
peer-evaluations where the contract must induce both agents to reveal their signal truthfully.
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Finally, the above finding also indicates the condition under which it is optimal to induce
effort in the stage game. Note that the stage game payoff under the optimal subjective
contract (with effort inducement) is π̂c := v − 2c − ẑc. The sign of π̂c is determined by the
following: if Plh > (1− P ) q then π̂c ≥ 0 if and only if:
(6)
β1 (1− q)
α1 (1− P )
≥ v
v − 2c.
And if Plh ≤ (1− P ) q, then π̂c ≥ 0 if and only if:
(7)




Using the above observations, the following proposition characterizes the optimal contract
with correlated signals.
Proposition 6. (Optimal relational contract with correlated signals) If Plh > (1− P ) q,
then the optimal contract is as given in Proposition 4. If Plh ≤ (1− P ) q, there exists a
threshold discount factor δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following holds:
(A) If δ ≥ δ∗, then both agents exert effort, subjective performance bonus is not used: w = w∗
and wrs (Y ) = w∗/2 for all Y and r, s ∈ S, and the public bonus payment takes the form:
b∗ (Y ) =
{
b∗ if Y ≥ yk∗
0 otherwise
,




(B) If δ < δ∗, there are two cases: (i) If β1(1−q)q
α1Plh
< v
v−2c , then agents do not exert effort.
(ii) Otherwise, both agents exert effort. The subjective performance bonus takes the form
specified in Proposition 5. The public bonus takes the form:
b∗ (Y ) =
{
b∗∗c (δ) if Y ≥ yk∗
0 otherwise
,
where b∗∗c (δ) is increasing in δ.
The above proposition closely parallels Proposition 4, in that subjective performance bonus
is used only when the firm is impatient, and when the surplus destruction it necessitates is
small. But in contrast to Proposition 4, an agent’s pay can now depend on his own report
about his co-worker. Moreover, the surplus destruction depends on the correlation between
the signals. Specifically, the smaller is Plh, the smaller is the surplus destruction.
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7. Discussion
This section presents a few remarks about our modeling assumptions.
Information Structure: Below, we discuss three assumptions on our information structure.
First, in our general model we assume that the agents exert effort towards a joint output.
It is important for our results that the public performance signal reflects the agents’joint
effort choice. If, instead, there are multiple public signals, each reflecting the individual
effort choices of the two agents, then the first best could be achieved. Specifically, consider
a setting in which the agents work on independent projects each generating a public signal
about the output but the agents still get private signals about each other’s effort choices.
In this case, the firm’s problem is separable in two independent parts. Essentially, the firm
can offer two independent contracts as described in our baseline model, where one contract
induces effort from the first agent using the second agent in the manager’s role and the other
contract does the opposite. Our baseline analysis implies that the first best can be achieved.
Second, we assume that the peer evaluations are reported privately. This is consistent with
what is commonly observed. In most peer evaluation systems in practice, feedback is sub-
mitted privately, often even anonymously, in order to encourage candid reporting (Edwards
and Ewen, 1996). An alternative possibility is to assume that peer reports are public. In
this case, the double deviation problem remains but as there is no truth-telling constraint on
the firm, the contract performance weakly improves. However, a complete characterization
of the optimal contract is diffi cult, and beyond the scope of this article. As the public bonus
is a function of the output and the reports, the truth-telling and the dynamic enforcement
constraints becomes closely intertwined and renders the optimal contracting problem loses
analytical tractability.
Finally, note that we do not consider self-evaluation in our model. While the agents
observe and report a signal on their co-worker’s performance, they do not observe or report
any additional signal on their own performance. When an agent’s self-evaluation is merely a
report on his own effort level, such evaluations do not help the contract performance as the
evaluations do not vary on the equilibrium path. But, if the agents receive additional signals
on their own performances, self-evaluation may improve the contract performance. A formal
analysis of self-evaluation, however, is beyond the scope of our model. Our modeling choice
is also consistent with what we observe in practice: Though self-appraisals are common
in many organizations, much of the literature suggests that self-appraisal is used more as a
developmental tool than as a performance evaluation tool (see, for instance, Mabe and West,
1982; and Wexley and Klimoski, 1984).12
Contract Space: We adopt a standard contract specification used in the literature on sub-
jective evaluation. Our setup parallels that of MacLeod (2003) who considers a single agent
setting with subjective evaluation in which the firm commits to a payroll expense. In our
multiple agent setting we could assume that the firm commits to a payroll expense for each
agent. Instead, we assume that the firm commits to a total payroll expense. This is a weaker
assumption and also economizes on notation. In addition, commitment to a payroll expense
12In the management literature, the usefulness of self-appraisals (except as a vehicle for personal develop-
ment) is highly debated, mainly because of the lack of convergence between self-appraisals and supervisors’
ratings (see Campbell and Lee, 1998). Inconsistencies in feedback are often attributed to the “leniency bias”
in self-evaluation (Xie et al., 2006; Nilsen and Campbell, 1993; Yammarino and Atwater, 1997).
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is a standard assumption in the literature on team incentives that dates back to Malcomson
(1986).
In the literature, a common alternative to explicit money-burning is to implement money-
burning via termination; see for example, Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007). Our main findings
are unaffected if we use termination (instead of money-burning) as a disciplining device. The
difference is that if termination is used, the amount of money-burning is limited by the size
of the surplus in the relationship. As a result, the relational contract becomes less effective
when the relationship has a smaller surplus.
While money-burning is necessary in our setting, it can be mitigated in a more general
environment. For example, suppose that the firm interacts with several teams independently.
The money that is burnt in one team is given evenly to all agents in the other teams; so, in
the aggregate, money is never burnt. Similarly, consider the case in which the team has at
least three workers. In this case, the money that is burnt for one worker can be given equally
to all other workers who are not the evaluators, and again there is no money-burning in the
aggregate.13 However, if monetary transfer among agents is not frictionless, (e.g., if agents
are liquidity constrained) surplus destruction may again be necessary.
Strategy Space: We have already mentioned that it is necessary to restrict the class of
strategies in our model in order to ensure tractability. And in this class of strategies, we
induce truth-telling from the firm by using money-burning. It is worth noting that the
literature on mechanism design and repeated games has suggested alternative monitoring
devices (see, e.g., Crémer and McLean, 1988; and Ben-Porath and Kahneman, 1996). A
commonly used strategy in this literature is to cross-check the reports from interested parties
and punish them if there is a mismatch. In a recent article, Rahman (2012) adopts a different
approach of “monitoring the monitor.”In his setting, a principal hires a monitor to supervise
a worker, but the monitor privately observes the worker’s deviation. To overcome the private
monitoring problem, on occasions, the principal secretly asks the agent to shirk and rewards
the monitor if he is able to detect these “prompted deviations.”To apply Rahman’s strategy
in our setting (to induce truth-telling by the firm), we would have to allow the agents to
occasionally prompt each other on what peer evaluation to report, and then check if the firm
reports back truthfully. We would have to allow agents to observe each other’s peer reports
or credibly communicate their reports to each other, as well as allow side payments between
agents. We do not adopt this alternate setting as this is not consistent with peer evaluation
mechanisms that are observed in practice.
8. Conclusion
This article studies the optimal contracting problem of a firm in environments where the
performance measures are non-verifiable and the workers have superior knowledge about each
other’s performance. The firm can use relational contracts to tie pay to publicly observable
performance measures, but it can also attempt to elicit private information from the workers
and use this information for compensation design. As the workers’information is inherently
private and subjective, the agents and the firm must have the right incentives for truthful
revelation of information.
13We thank Andy Skrzypacz for suggesting this example. See Malcomson (1986) for a formal analysis of
such a contract.
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Our analysis suggests that when the informative and productive roles of a worker can be
separated, contracts can achieve the first-best outcome, as the private information can be
obtained without incurring any additional agency cost. However, if workers perform both
informative and productive roles, then the use of private information is a more delicate
matter. We show that the worker’s effort incentives cannot be decoupled from his truth-
telling incentives. In particular, when the worker’s peer evaluation affects his own pay,
contracts that are robust to single deviations may fall victim to a double-deviation in which
the worker shirks and then lies about his peer’s performance. The interconnectedness of
effort and truth-telling incentives implies that the firm may neglect some information about
the worker’s effort to elicit truthful peer evaluations. The optimal contract fails to achieve
first-best and must involve surplus destruction on the equilibrium path. Peer evaluations are
used in the optimal relational contract only when the associated level of surplus destruction
is small and the firm is relatively impatient.
We conclude with brief remarks on two issues. First, we have assumed that subjective peer
evaluation is performed in each period. Frequent feedback about performance is not always
optimal: For example, Fuchs (2007) shows that when subjective evaluation is used, reducing
the frequency of evaluation can mitigate the amount of surplus destruction. In addition,
Fong and Li (2013) show that less information can sometimes help in sustaining the relational
contract by reducing the principal’s temptation to renege on the bonus. A natural next step
is to study how different information-collection processes affect organizational performance.
In addition to questions about the frequency of peer evaluations, one can also ask how peer
evaluations interact with other information sources, such as self-evaluations. These issues
are crucial in practice, and further research in this direction is needed.
Second, an important issue related to information collection is the potential for collusion
among the workers. Collusion is known to be a general problem in contracting environments
with multiple agents (see, for example, Laffont and Martimort, 2000). However, the extent
to which collusion poses a problem depends on the nature of the team. Following the classi-
fication of teams suggested by Scott and Einstein (2001), collusion is more of an issue in the
“work and service”teams, where a group of workers are assigned to a “routine manufactur-
ing or service tasks.”In contrast, one would expect collusion to be less of an issue if agents
do not anticipate repeated interaction. This may be the case in “project teams” that are
formed for a specific task and usually reconfigured upon completion of the task. Calzolari
and Spagnolo (2009) make a similar observation in the context of procurement contract-
ing environments where small groups of frequently interacting agents help sustaining strong
relational incentives but are also more conducive to collusive behavior.
How does collusion affect the optimal contract in our setting? Note that the optimal
contract may not be “collusion-proof” in the sense that workers may be able to avoid the
punishment associated with a bad peer evaluation by always submitting good reports about
each other. But as noted earlier (in section 5) such a collusion scheme may not be profitable
for the agents as it encourages both the agents to shirk. In fact, simple collusive schemes
where the agents collude on both their effort decisions and reporting behavior may also hurt
the agents for the same reason– when agents shirk in every period, they exert a negative
externality on each other through lowering the expected bonus associated with the public
output (see Appendix B for a formal example). This observation leads to the natural question
of how the workers can collude more generally while maintaining their effort levels. How
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collusion affects the design of peer evaluations and, thus, how information is collected within
organizations is an interesting topic for future research.
Appendix
Appendix A. This appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. Trivially, the proposed contract yields the first-best payoff of
v − c. So, it remains to show that this contract is indeed feasible. Note that (B) is
satisfied as ŵAs (Y ) + ŵ
M
s (Y ) = c = ŵ for all Y , s, and r. To check (T ), note that
for all s, EY
[
wMs (Y ) | eA = 1, sM = s
]
= 0. For s 6= s1, this holds by construction
and for s = s1, EY
[
wMs (Y ) | eA = 1, sM = s
]
= α1∆A + αN (−∆M) = 0. Similarly,
EY
[
wMs′ (Y ) | eA = 1, sM = s
]
= 0 for all s and s′. Next, consider (IC): E{Y,s}[wAs (Y ) | eA
= 1] − c = c + α1p1 (−∆A) + αNp1 (∆M) − c = 0, and E{Y,s}
[
wAs (Y ) | eA = 0
]
= c+
β1q1 (−∆A) + βNq1 (∆M) = 0. The above observations also imply that both (IRA) and
(IRM) bind. Hence, the proposed contract is indeed feasible.
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1. Note that (T ′) must bind. For any two s and s′ ∈ S,
we must have
E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) | e = 1, si = s] ≥ E{Y,r} [wrs′ (Y ) | e = 1, si = s] ,
and
E{Y,r} [wrs′ (Y ) | e = 1, si = s′] ≥ E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) | e = 1, si = s′] .
Combining these two inequalities and using the fact that the expectations are independent
of si (as the distribution of {r, Y } conditional on e is independent of s), we obtain that for
all s and s′ ∈ S,
E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) | e = 1] = E{Y,r} [wrs′ (Y ) | e = 1] . (T ′′)
Step 2. Observe that (T ′′) implies that E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) |e = 1, si = s] must be independent
of s. Now, the (IR) can be rewritten as
Es
[
E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) |e = 1, si = s]
]
≥ 0.
Thus, it must be the case that
E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) |e = 1, si = s] = E{Y,r} [wrs (Y ) |e = 1] = 0 ∀s ∈ S. (IR′′)
Otherwise, the firm could achieve a higher payoff by reducing its committed payroll expense
w and all subjective performance bonus wrs (Y ) by a small amount ε > 0 while still not
violating any constraints. Now, if (IR′′) holds, (T ′′) must hold as well. Also, using (IR′′),
one can rewrite (IC ′) as
0 ≥ E{Y,r} [wrs′ (Y ) |ei = 0] ∀s′ ∈ S. (IC ′′)
Thus, the firm’s problem reduces to maximizing v − w subject to (B′), (IR′′) and (IC ′′).
Step 3. Define the Lagrangian for the firm’s problem as
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ηjsr = 1, and(8)
λsαjpr − µsβjqr = ηjsr + ηjrs.(9)
Also, the complementary slackness conditions are: ∀j, r, and s,










βjqrwrs (yj) = 0.
Step 4. We claim that there exists a set of non-negative Lagrange multipliers such that
the proposed compensation schedule along with the set of multipliers satisfy the first-order









r∈S qrwrs (yj) = 0 ∀s ∈ S. Also note
that ŵ− ŵrs (yj)− ŵsr (yj) = 0 ∀j > 1 and ŵ− ŵrs (y1)− ŵsr (y1) = 0 ∀r, s > 1. Thus, any
set of ηjsr, λs and µs values satisfies the complementary slackness conditions as long as
(10) η11r = η
1
s1 = 0 ∀ r, s ∈ S.
Now, consider the following values of the multipliers:
(11) µs = ν (q1ps − qsp1) for some ν > 0, and λs = µsβ1q1/α1p1.
By MLRP, (q1ps − qsp1) = q1qs (ps/qs − p1/q1) > 0. Hence, µs ≥ 0, and therefore, λs ≥ 0
∀s ∈ S. Also, given the proposed values of the multipliers in (10) and (11), it is routine to
check that the first-order condition (9) is satisfied if s and/or r = 1.
Hence, it remains to show that one can find values of ηjsr for s, r > 1, such that they
satisfy the first-order conditions.







































As before, by MLRP, ηjsr ≥ 0. Also, by construction, the first-order conditions (9) are now
satisfied. Thus, the proposed compensation scheme, along with the Lagrangian multipliers,
satisfies all first-order conditions and the complementary slackness condition. Hence, the
proposed compensation scheme is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4. Step 1. We argue that without loss of generality, we can restrict
attention to the class of contracts where
w = wrs(Y ) + wsr(Y ) for all Y > y1.
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We show this by contradiction. Suppose that this is not true for some yj > y1, r, and
s = s∗ ∈ S. Consider a new subjective performance bonus scheme where





and w′rs(Y ) = wrs(Y ) for all (r, s, Y ) 6= (r, s∗, y1) or (r, s∗, yj). Note that under the new
payment scheme, (a) the value in the objective function does not change; (b) constraint (B′)
remains satisfied; and (c) (DE) is not affected. Now to check (T ′), note that if the agent
reports s∗, we have, by construction,
E{Y,r} [wrs∗ (Y ) |e = 1] = E{Y,r} [w′rs∗ (Y ) |e = 1] .
And if the agent reports s′ 6= s∗, then
E{Y,r} [wrs′ (Y ) |e = 1] = E{Y,r} [w′rs′ (Y ) |e = 1] ,
since w′rs′ (Y ) = wrs′ (Y ) for all (Y, r, s
′) where s′ 6= s∗. Finally, to check (IC ′), we need to
make sure that
E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + w′rs (Y ) |e = 1]− c ≥ E{Y,r} [b (Y ) + w′rs′ (Y ) |ei = 0] ∀s′.
Note that for all s, by construction,
E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + w′rs (Y ) |e = 1]− c = E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) |e = 1]− c.
On the right-hand side of (IC ′), if s′ 6= s∗,
E{Y,r} [b (Y ) + w′rs′ (Y ) |ei = 0] = E{Y,r} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) |ei = 0]
as none of the values are changed. And if s = s∗, we have




< E{Y,r} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) |ei = 0] .
This shows that if under any contract, we have w > wrs(Y ) + wsr(Y ) some Y > y1, r, and
s, there always exists another contract that makes the inequality bind but gives the same
payoff to the firm.
Step 2. We claim that if the surplus destruction is positive, then the agent’s (IC ′) constraint
E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) |e = 1]− c ≥ max
s′
E{Y,r} [b (Y ) + wrs′ (Y ) |ei = 0] ∀s′
must bind with equality. To see this, suppose that the above is slack. Now define

















This implies that the truth-telling constraint (T ′) remains satisfied. We can also check that
(B′) and (DE) are also satisfied. For small enough ε, the (IC ′) constraint remains satisfied.
Note that this change reduces the surplus destruction by ε (in proportion). This implies
that the (IC ′) constraint must bind.
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Step 3. Define k∗ to be the unique index such that αk∗ > βk∗ but αk∗−1 < βk∗−1. If the
surplus destruction is positive, then there exists a b such that
b (Y ) =
{
b if Y ≥ yk∗
0 otherwise .
Note that for j < k∗, by decreasing b (yj) , we (weakly) relax (DE) and (IC ′), and we
do not affect other constraints. Similarly, for j ≥ k∗, by increasing b (yj) , we relax (IC ′)
and we do not affect other constraints. In this case, (DE) remains satisfied as long as
b (yj) = maxl{b(yl)}. Also, note that the above value of b (yj) is unique. If there exists a
b (yj) < b for some j ≥ k∗, we can increase b (yj) by ε1 and relax the (IC ′) constraint. But
from Step 2 above, we know that if (IC ′) is relaxed, then the firm can set




for some small enough ε2, and reduces the the level of surplus destruction.
Step 4. Next, consider the case in which effort can be induced using only the relational
contract (i.e., no surplus is destroyed in equilibrium). From (IC ′) and the formulation of the
optimal bonus pay as given in Step 3, we obtain that b = b∗ := 2c/
∑N
j=k∗(αj − βj) if effort
must be induced by using bonus pay alone. In this case, a necessary and suffi cient condition
for sustaining such a relational contract is
(12)
δ




The above condition is satisfied when δ is higher than a threshold, say δ∗, at which the above
inequality binds.
Step 5. If δ < δ∗, the optimal contract may use subjective performance bonus, and surplus
will be destroyed. In this case, suppose that the maximum bonus is given by b; then, we can
rewrite the (DE) constraint in the firm’s program P ′ as
δ
1− δπ ≥ 2b. (DE)
(Recall that the punishment payoff of the firm, π, is 0). Now the program can be solved in
two steps. First, for a fixed b, we choose wrs (y1) to minimize the surplus destruction, and
second, we choose the largest b for which the above (DE) holds. Note that in the first step,
the problem is the same as the static one with the agent’s cost of effort equal to









v − 2c (b) ,
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Otherwise, no subjective performance bonus is used. This solves for the first step. In the












That is, we need to find the largest b for which the above condition (15) holds. Note that at









1− δ [v − 2c− ẑ] .
Here we have two cases.
Case 1: If β1q1/(α1p1) < v/ (v − 2c) (i.e., effort cannot be induced in a Nash equilibrium
of the stage game), v − 2c − ẑ < 0. Also, at b = c/(
∑N
j=k∗(αj − βj)), condition (15) is
violated (recall that we are considering the case where (12) fails). Thus, there is no value of
b that satisfies (15). So, b = 0. As (14) is also violated in this case (note that c (0) = c), no
subjective performance bonus is used either.
Case 2: If β1q1/(α1p1) ≥ v/ (v − 2c) (i.e., effort can be induced in a Nash equilibrium
of the stage game), v − 2c − ẑ ≥ 0. Also, as noted above, at b = c/(
∑N
j=k∗(αj − βj)), the
condition (15) is violated. Since both sides of condition (15) are linear in b, this implies that
the highest b that satisfies (15), b∗∗ (δ) (say), is the one at which (15) holds with equality.
That is,
b∗∗ (δ) =
δ [β1q1 (v − 2c)− α1p1v]
2
[








This observation completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Before we present the proof, it is worthwhile to rewrite the op-
timal contracting problem under the given signal structure. We discuss below the problem
under the dynamic setting as it would be useful in our proof of Proposition 6 and it also
subsumes the statement of the problem in the static case.
As noted earlier, the firm solves P ′ where the distribution over the private signals (r, s)
are given as in section 6.1. While the set of constraints remains the same substantively, the
algebraic expressions for all constraints, except the budget constraint (B′) and the dynamic
enforcement constraint (DE), would change as the signals are no longer independent.
The individual rationality constraint for Ai is:
UAi := E{Y,r,s} [b (Y ) + wrs (Y ) | e = 1]− c ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 (IR)
and the truth-telling constraints are:∑N
j=1 αj [Phlwhl (yj) + Pllwll (yj)] ≥
∑N
j=1 αj [Phlwhh (yj) + Pllwlh (yj)] . (Tl)∑N
j=1 αj [Phhwhh (yj) + Plhwlh (yj)] ≥
∑N
j=1 αj [Phhwhl (yj) + Plhwll (yj)] , (Th)
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The (IC) constraint needs careful investigation. As signals are independent when ei = 0,
if Ai deviates, his signal is completely uninformative of the signal that A−i would get about
him. So, upon shirking, Ai would always report the signal that leads to higher expected
payoff ex-ante (given that ei = 0, and e−i = 1). Hence, the (IC) constraint boils down to:
UAi ≥
∑N
j=1 βj [b (yj) + qwhl (yj) + (1− q)wll (yj)] , (ICl)
UAi ≥
∑N
j=1 βj [b (yj) + qwhh (yj) + (1− q)wlh (yj)] . (ICh)
So, the firm’s problem is to maximize its payoff subject to the above set of constraints.
That is, in the repeated game, the firm’s problem is:
maxφ∈Φ π = v − {w + 2EY [b (Y ) | e = 1]}
s.t. (B′) , (IR) , (Th) , (Tl) , (DE) , (ICl) , and (ICh) .
The static game counterpart of this problem can be derived simply by ignoring (DE) and
setting b (Y ) = 0 for all Y . That is, the firm’s problem in the stage game is
Pc
 max{w,wrs(Y )} v − w
s.t. (B′) , (IR) , (Th) , (Tl) , (ICl) , and (ICh) .
We are now ready to present the proof, which is given in the following steps:
Step 1. We first show that for any solution {w∗, w∗rs (Y )} to Pc, there exists another solution
{w∗, w̃rs (Y )} where ∀Y > y1, w̃hh (Y ) = w̃ll (Y ) = w∗/2, and w̃hl (Y ) + w̃lh (Y ) = w∗. The
proof is given by the following two sub-steps:
Step 1a: If {w∗, w∗rs (Y )} solves P ′c, there exists a solution {w∗, w̃rs (Y )} where w̃rs (Y ) =
w∗/2 ∀Y > y1 and rs = hh or ll. Consider the following candidate solution {w∗, w̃rs (Y )}
such that w̃rs (Y ) = w∗rs (Y ) ∀Y 6= y1 and Y 6= yj for some j > 1. Now for for Y = y1, let








w∗ − w∗hh (yj)
)








w∗ − w∗ll (yj)
)
,
and w̃rs (y1) = w∗rs (y1) if r 6= s.
And for Y = yj, let
w̃hh (yj) = w̃ll (yj) =
1
2
w∗ and and w̃rs (y1) = w∗rs (y1) if r 6= s.
We argue that {w∗, w̃rs (Y )} is feasible, and hence, also optimal (as it specifies the same
payroll expense, w∗, as in the initial solution). Note that (i) the agent’s payoff UA is un-
changed by construction so (IR) is satisfied, (ii) (B′) is satisfied (as for Y = y1, wrs values
are lowered for rs = hh and ll and for the rest there are no changes in wrs), (iii) (Th) and
(Tl) are satisfied (as the values are unchanged for both sides of the inequality (for both in-
equalities)), and (iv) the (IC)s become more slack: first consider (ICl). For the right hand
side, the change in value is given by
β1 [q (w̃hl (y1)− w∗hl (y1)) + (1− q) (w̃ll (y1)− w∗ll (y1))] +
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as βj < β1
αj
α1
by MLRP and 1
2
w∗ ≤ w∗ll (yj). Similarly, for (ICh) , the change in value in












Step 1b: Suppose {w∗, w∗rs (Y )} solves P ′c. We argue that there exists a solution {w∗, w̃rs (Y )}
where for j > 1, w̃hl (yj) + w̃lh (yj) = w∗. Suppose that w∗hl (yj) + w
∗
lh (yj) > w
∗ for some
yj > 1. Then either w∗hl (yj) <
1
2
w∗ or w∗lh (yj) <
1
2
w∗. If w∗hl (yj) <
1
2
w∗, consider a candidate
solution {w∗, w̃rs (Y )} such that w̃rs (Y ) = w∗rs (Y ) for all Y 6= y1 and Y 6= yj. Now for
Y = y1, set





ε, and w̃rs (y1) = w∗rs (y1) for rs 6= hl,
and for Y = yj, set
w̃hl (yj) = w
∗
hl (yj) + ε, and w̃rs (yj) = w
∗
rs (yj) for rs 6= hl.
Now it is routine to check that {w∗, w̃rs (Y )} is feasible, and hence, is a solution to the
program (as it specifies the same payroll expense, w∗, as in the initial solution). Note that
(i) the agent’s payoffUA is unchanged by construction; so (IR) is satisfied, (ii) (B′) is satisfied
for small enough ε > 0 (as (N) is slack for Y = yj), (iii) (Th) and (Tl) are satisfied (as the
values are unchanged for both sides of the inequality (for both inequalities)), and (iv) (ICh)
is unchanged and (ICl) becomes more slack. In particular, in the right hand side of (ICl),





(As βj < β1
αj
α1
by MLRP.) This implies that we can keep increasing w̃hl (yj) until w̃hl (yj) +
w̃lh (yj) = w




vation completes step 1 of the proof.
Step 2.We now show that (IR) must bind. Take an optimal contract {w∗, w∗rs (Y )} . If (IR)
is slack, we can replace it with {w̃, w̃rs (Y )} such that w̃ = w∗− ε and w̃rs (Y ) = w∗rs (Y )− ε
for all Y and rs. For small enough ε > 0, the (IR) remains satisfied and none of the other
constraints are changed, but the firm’s payoff is higher. Hence, {w∗, w∗rs (Y )} cannot be
optimal.
Step 3. Using Step 2, we can now rewrite the problem in terms of surplus destruction for








w − wll (yj) , ∆lj = wll (yj)− wlh (yj) .
Now given that (IR) binds and there is no surplus destruction for all yj with j > 1. To
simplify notations, let P ≡ Phh + Phl and recall that Phl = Plh (by symmetry assumption).
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Step 1 implies that the budget constraints are automatically satisfied for all j > 1. For








1 ≥ 0; δl1 ≥ 0; δh1 ≥ 0. (B′c)




j and note that by Step 1,∑N
j=2 αj∆
l

























. Notice that if α1∆l1−Sα < 0,










which contradicts the assumption PhhPll > PlhPhl. Finally, if α1∆l1 − Sα = 0, we then must











1 − Sα > 0
or α1∆l1 − Sα = 0, α1∆h1 + Sα = 0.
(T ′c)









Now, (ICl) and (ICh) can be combined as:
α1
(




































s.t. (B′c) , (T
′
c) , and (IC
′
c) .




1 ≥ 0. Suppose δh1 > 0. Then,
we decrease δh1 by (1− q) ε for small ε > 0 and increases δl1 by qε. This changes the value of
the objective by
2α1 (−P (1− q) ε+ (1− P ) qε) < 0
since P > q. In addition, it relaxes the (IC) constraints. This is a contradiction and therefore
we must have δh1 = 0.
If ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 < 0, (T ) is violated. To see this, note first that it cannot be the case that
α1∆
l
1 − Sα = 0 and α1∆h1 + Sα = 0 because they imply that ∆l1 + ∆h1 = 0. Next, we















1 − Sα > 0. This is because given α1∆l1 − Sα > 0, we have Sα < α1∆l1, and therefore
α1∆
h
































Given ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 ≥ 0 and δh1 ≥ 0, (B′c) reduces to:
δl1 ≥ 0; (B′′c )
and (IC ′c) reduces to:
α1
(
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So, the optimization problem boils down to
P ′c : min{δl1,∆hj ,∆lj}
D s.t. (B′′c ) , (T ′c) and (IC ′′c ) .








. We argue that either ∆h1 +∆
l
1 = 0 or δ
l
1 = 0.
Recall that the truth-telling conditions imply that ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 ≥ 0. Suppose ∆h1 + ∆l1 > 0 and





























N := β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P ) .






















































Under this alternative candidate solution, both (IC ′′c ) and (T
′
c) remain satisfied. Given that
δl1 > 0, (B
′′











the surplus destruction is given by:
2α1
(
















Plh − (1− P ) MN
)
ε.
This implies that the surplus destruction can always be lowered as long as Plh−(1− P ) MN 6=










is still a solution, and hence, we can continue
to lower δl1 and hence, δ
l
1 = 0 is a solution. This proves that either δ
l





Step 5. First, consider the case where ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 = 0. The objective is then to minimize δ
l
1.
Note that (IC ′′c ) is given by:














































(the inequality follows because the minimum of the two element is weakly larger than the
weighted average of the two). This implies that (β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P )) δl1 ≥ c. Note that
the minimal δl1 feasible is:
δl∗1 =
c
β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P )
.
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j = 0 ∀j is a feasible solution, and therefore, it is optimal. In this case,
the surplus destruction is given by
D∗ = 2α1 (1− P ) c
β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P )
.





already argued that at the optimum, ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 ≥ 0. But notice that we cannot have ∆h1 +
∆l1 = 0 in this case as it would violate (IC
′′
c ). Thus, we cannot have α1∆
l
1 − Sα = 0 and
α1∆
h


















for some θ < 1, and therefore








































































. It follows from (IC ′c) that












(1− q) qβ1 − α1Plh
.
This implies that if one can choose ∆hj and ∆
l




1 = c/ ((1− q) qβ1 − α1Plh),
this solution is then optimal. Moreover,∆h1+∆
l


























, and therefore,it is optimal.

























with α1∆l1 − Sα > 0;
and




(1− q) qβ1 − α1Plh
,
We show this by construction. Let ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 = c/ ((1− q) qβ1 − α1Plh). Consider a candi-












, and ∆hj = ∆
H
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for all j ≥ 2, for some M and ∆H . Note that the candidate solution satisfies (D1). For this








1 + (1− α1) ∆H











1 + (1− β1) ∆H
β1∆
l
1 − (1− β1) ∆H
.




1 + (1− α1) ∆H









1 + (1− β1) ∆H
β1∆
l






































































(1 + Pll/Phl) (β1 − α1)
((1 + Pll/Phl) q − 1) .
Step 8. We now characterize the optimal solution. Recall that surplus destruction is given
by α1
(






. Step 4 shows that either ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 = 0 or δ
l
1 = 0. When
∆h1 + ∆
l
1 = 0, we know from Step 5 that δ
l
1 = c/ (β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P )). When δl1 = 0,
Step 6 shows that ∆h1 + ∆
l
1 = c/ ((1− q) qβ1 − α1Plh). It follows that we choose δl1 = 0 iff
2α1Plhc
(1− q) qβ1 − α1Plh
≤ 2α1 (1− P ) c
β1 (1− q)− α1 (1− P )
⇔ Plh ≤ (1− P ) q.
Hence the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. This proof closely follows the proof of Proposition 4. Hence, in
what follows, we present a brief outline of the proof but highlight the part where the current
proof differs from the proof of Proposition 4.
Step 1. First, note that steps 1 to 3 of Proposition 4 continue to hold in this setting.
Step 2. Now, suppose Plh > (1− P ) q. By Proposition 5, the optimal contract in the static
game is the same as the one derived under independent private signals. Also, condition (6) is
identical to condition (4) (note that p1 defined in the context of independent-signal structure
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is equal to 1 − P as defined in the case of correlated signals; similarly, q1 = 1 − q). Thus,
the optimal contract derived in the independent-signal case continues to be the optimal in
this setting.
Step 3. Finally, consider the case in which Plh ≤ (1− P ) q. Using the same logic as
presented in Step 4 of Proposition 4, we argue that if δ ≥ δ∗, then subjective performance
bonus is never used and effort is induced only by relational contract (the optimal contract
is the same as defined in Step 4 of Proposition 4).
If δ < δ∗, the proof closely follows Step 5 of Proposition 4. Following this step and using
Proposition 5, we conclude the following: If
(19)




v − 2c (b) ,
then the firm uses the following subjective contract in equilibrium: There exists some w = w̄c
such that for Y = y1,




w̄c −∆l1 if (r, s) = (l, h)
1
2











1 = c/ (β1q (1− q)− α1Plh); and for Y > y1,




w̄c if (r, s) = (h, h) or (l, l)
w̄c − wsr (Y ) if (r, s) = (h, l) or (l, h)
.





Otherwise, no subjective performance bonus is used. This solves for the first step.
In the second step, for (DE) to be satisfied, we need
(20)
δ
1− δ [v − 2c− zc (b)] ≥ 2b.
That is, we need to find the largest b for which the above condition (20) holds. Note that at
b = 0, the left-hand side is
δ
1− δ [v − 2c− zc (0)] =
δ
1− δ [v − 2c− ẑ] .
Here we have two cases.
Case 1: If (7) is violated (i.e., effort cannot be induced in a Nash equilibrium of the stage
game), v−2c− ẑ < 0. Also, at b = c/(
∑N
j=k∗(αj−βj)), condition (20) is violated (recall that
we are considering the case in which (12) fails). Thus, there is no value of b that satisfies
(20). So, b = 0. Also, if (7) is violated, then (19) is also violated as c (0) = c. Thus, no
subjective performance bonus is used when b = 0.
Case 2: If (7) holds (i.e., effort can be induced in a Nash equilibrium of the stage game),
v−2c− ẑ ≥ 0. But, as noted above, at b = c/(
∑N
j=k∗(αj−βj)), the condition (20) is violated.
Since both sides of condition (20) are linear in b, this implies that the highest b that satisfies
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(20), b∗∗c (δ) (say), is the one at which (20) holds with equality. This observation completes
the proof.
Appendix B. In this appendix we show that stationary collusion– i.e., in all periods, all
agents shirk but always send good peer evaluations– may not be incentive compatible as it
hurts the agents by exacerbating the free-riding problem associated with the effort provision.
But to simplify the analysis, we study a special case of our model by considering a binary
signal structure and a specific form of the production function.
Consider a team with two agents where in every period, each agent exerts effort e ∈ {0, 1}
to produce a team output Y ∈ {0, y} . Let Pr (Y = y) = α (e1 + e2) where α < 1/2. As before,
assume that each agent Ai receives a signal si ∈ {0, 1} that is informative of his co-worker
A−i’s effort level. We assume that Pr (si = 1 | e−i = 1) = p and Pr (si = 1 | e−i = 0) = 0.
Let the cost of effort be c if e = 1 and 0 otherwise. By Proposition 4, we know that the
optimal contract is of the following form: for each agent Ai, the firm commits to a payroll
expense w and promises an additional bonus b (> 0) if Y = y. Moreover, a part, ∆ (> 0),
of the payroll expense is burnt if Y = 0 and the report received by Ai, ri (say), is 0. Thus,
the agent Ai’s compensation ωi is:
ωi =
 w + b if Y = yw if Y = 0 and ri = 1w −∆ if Y = 0 and ri = 0 .
Now, we argue that there exists a p∗ such that for all p > p∗, the optimal contract uses
subjective evaluation and the agent will not engage in stationary collusion (i.e., choose ri = 1










1− δ (αy − c) .
The argument is as follows. Notice that the agent’s (IR) and (IC) constraints are given as:
w + 2αb− (1− 2α) (1− p) ∆− c ≥ 0, (IR)
αb+ (p+ (1− 2p)α) ∆ ≥ c. (IC)
Also, the firm’s non-reneging constraint (DE) is given by
b ≤ δ
1− δ (αy − c− (1− 2α) (1− p) ∆) . (DE)
In the optimal contract, it is clear that the agent’s (IR) constraint must be binding, i.e.,
w = (1 − 2α) (1− p) ∆ + c − 2αb. Thus, the optimal contracting problem minimizes the
surplus destruction and is given as:
min
b,∆
∆ s.t. (IC) and (DE)
Note that when the first-best is not achieved the (IC) must be binding, so
b = 1
α
(c− (p+ (1− 2p)α) ∆) . Plugging the value of b back in (DE) (which must also





1−δ (αy − c)
1
α
(p+ (1− 2p)α)− δ
1−δ (1− 2α) (1− p)
.
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Notice that for p suffi ciently close to 1, we must have
1
α
(p+ (1− 2p)α) > δ
1− δ (1− 2α) (1− p) ,




(c− (p+ (1− 2p)α) ∆∗) , and w∗ = (1− 2α) (1− p) ∆∗ + c− 2αb∗.
Notice also that b∗ < c/α, and therefore, if the agents engage in stationary collusion, each










1− δ (αy − c) ,
and
w∗ = c− 2αδ
1− δ (αy − c) .
Note that under condition (21), w∗ < 0. Since w∗ is continuous in p, it follows that there
exists a p∗ such that for all p > p∗, w∗ < 0. Therefore, the agent will not engage in stationary
collusion as it would yield a negative payoff and violate the agent’s participation constraint.
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